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Abstract:
The financial crises of the late 1990s have marked a watershed for the global economy
and for regionalism. Prior to these crises, deregulation and liberalisation, in particular of
financial markets, enjoyed widespread support. On the other hand, regional integration was
aimed at improving conditions for regional trade and was based on Bela Balassa’s forty ye r old
theory of regional integration. At the beginning of the 21st century, the theoretical approach to
regional integration will have to be a different one. Regionalism will have to offer enhanced
protection against financial crises, whereas trade liberalisation in an era of rapid trade
liberalisation both offers fewer benefits and may be too complicated to implement due to high
administrative costs associated in particular with free trade areas. The aim of this paper is to
provide a theoretical framework for the emerging new monetary regionalism. Regions that wish
to strengthen their co-operation in monetary and financial affairs today have the option of
regionalism without trade agreements. East Asia is the most likely candidate for the
implementation of monetary regionalism, also because East Asian policy makers continue to be
frustrated with the lack of progress in the IMF’s reform process.
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21. Introduction
The financial crises of the late 1990s may have marked a watershed for the global economy.
Although neither the United States nor the European Union or Japan were severely affected by the
crises in Asia, Latin America and Russia, they have changed our understanding of the most
appropriate economic policies in particular for developing countries. After the crises, the emphasis
is different: Before 1997, the concepts of deregulation and reduced influence of governments
seemed to enjoy majority support not only in the G 7-countries, but also in the developing world.
Achieving high growth rates was the single most important aim of economic policy. Today, policy
makers have to meet other goals of equal importance: In particular in the developing world,
economic policy has to provide mechanisms against severe financial crises.
In this paper, I will argue that at the beginning of the 21st cen ury monetary regionalism provides a
plausible and potentially beneficial option for economic policy in some regions of the world,
particularly for East Asia and Latin America.2 Monetary regionalism offers solutions that
conventional regionalism has not been able to provide: Conventional regionalism is based on trade
integration and does not increase the monetary and financial linkages between participating
economies until they reach quite a high level of integration. It has taken the European Union more
than 40 years until such a level was reached and a common currency could have been created.3 In
the meantime, the countries participating in a conventional integration project do not enjoy
additional protection against financial crises: Neither with regard to the stabilisation of the
exchange rate of their currencies nor with regard to the stabilisation of capital flows do
conventional integration schemes strengthen the economies of their member states. Furthermore,
the creation of a traditional integration scheme can make countries politically more vulnerable.
This is particularly so in East Asia: The creation of a free trade area, customs union or common
market would provide ammunition for American Senators in the event of a recession in the US.
Asian countries could be accused of closing their own markets, but simultaneously benefi ing
from the open American market. Needless to say that this cannot be a tempting prospect for policy
makers in East Asia or Latin America.
The improvement of the existing multilateral institutions, in particular of the International
Monetary Fund, would certainly be a better choice. But today this is not a plausible option: The
IMF continues to be an institution whose policies have frequently resulted in disaster, in particular
                                                          
2) Throughout this paper, the term region is used for supranational regions.
3in East Asia and Russia, and which suffers from too much influence of the American Treasury and
Wall Street. It is a creditor cartel, not an institution primarily concerned with the needs of its
clients, i.e. the member states. After the IMF was heavily criticised by observers from East Asia,
now the IMF’s performance is questioned by insiders: The former Chief Economist of the World
Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, has in April 2000 provided a fierce critique of the IMF’s policies during the
crisis in Asia as well as in the process of Russia’s transformation, accusing the Fund of
implementing the wrong policies and being an institution that lacks both democratic structures and
able economists (cf. Stiglitz 2000).4
The developments in early 2000 have underlined that the US administration is not willing to give
up any influence on the IMF. The rejection of the first European candidate, Caio Koch-Weser, was
not based on a lack of qualification of the candidate, but rather on the assumption that Koch-Weser
would have represented a political position that the American government, in particular Finance
Minister Larry Summers, could not share. Summers has provided us with his own vision for
reform: The IMF shall, according to a proposal he made in late 1999, nor longer be concerned with
the financing of economic development. Rather, the IMF shall concentrate on the prevention of
financial crises and on the provision of liquidity in the event of a crisis.
Although this does not seem to be a radical proposal, in fact it is. The main point is that emergency
funds shall no longer be available to ll members of the Fund. Instead, only those countri s which
have observed the IMF-blueprint for financial liberalisation will be given access to credits of the
Fund. The centrepiece of this proposition is the by and large complete liberalisation of national
financial markets. If the Summers’ proposal would be implemented, American and other banks
would have many new opportunities, but the developing world would suffer, for at least two
reasons. Firstly, the complete opening of financial markets prior to the development of an own
competitive financial system would deprive the affected countries of the opportunity to develop.
The dominance of banks and institutional investors from G 7-countries would continue. Secondly,
the policies suggested by Larry Summers are risky because the complete liberalisation of financial
markets, as we have seen in particular in the Asian crisis, frequently results in the inflow of “hot
                                                                                                                                                                                             
3) However, the creation of the European Monetary System in 1979 already provided some level of monetary
co-operation in Europe.
4) Stiglitz has asked: “Most importantly, did America – and the IMF – push policies because we, or they,
believed the policies would help East Asia or because we believed they would benefit financial interests in the United
States and the advanced industrial world” (Stiglitz 2000, p. 10).
4money”.5 In the absence of measures to regulate financial inflows and outflows, monetary policy
becomes very difficult.6
In this paper, I will first look at the weak performance of existing regional integration projects in
East Asia and Latin America during the recent financial crises. Surprisingly, neither APEC nor
ASEAN provided any help. The trade regime in the Mercosur even caused a further spread of the
crisis from Brazil into neighbouring Argentina. After a brief discussion of the deficiencies of
traditional, trade-based regional integration I will introduce some elements that constitute
monetary regionalism. Although the practicality of this concept will yet have to be proven, we can
already witness today the introduction of some measures that may eventually result in regional
integration without formal trade agreements. In East Asia and Latin America, small steps have
already been taken. Finally, I will try to assess the prospects for monetary regionalism in East Asia
as well as the consequences for existing multilateral institutions, namely the IMF.
2. The Asian Crisis and the failure of existing regional integration projects
The events in 1997 and 1998 have both contributed to the evolution of an Asian integration project
and to the development of a new type of regionalism. The existing regional integration projects, in
particular the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) have not played any significant role during the crisis.
The failure of ASEAN underlines the inability of conventional, trade-based integration to avoid
the emergence of financial crises and to successfully limit their intensity. Although ASEAN is one
of the oldest regional integration projects and has been in operation for more than 3 decades, it had
nothing to offer in 1997. Neither liquidity nor at least good advice were provided. Instead, two
ASEAN countries, Thailand and Indonesia, had to call the IMF to the rescue. ASEAN has
emerged from the crisis in a damaged constitution. It has become clear that ASEAN’s current
vision, the establishment of a free trade area and the continuation of its low key approach to
regional integration have little future: The benefits from this type of supranational regionalism are
                                                          
5) Theoretically, foreign banks could be permitted without simultaneously abolishing capital controls. However,
foreign banks without access to international financial markets would probably have difficulties establishing their
business quickly.
6) In the case of an economy tending to simultaneously overheat and being subject to massive capital inflows, a
central bank cannot do much. Raising interest rates would increase the flow of capital into the country, an unwanted
effect. Lowering interest rates would contribute to the further overheating of the economy, also not a promising
prospect. The Bank of England may currently be in precisely that position in the first months of the year 2000.
5too limited to warrant the effort. Successful exporters to world markets can expect very limited
advantages from the creation of a free trade area in their region.7
For APEC, the Asian crisis that started in July 1997 has contributed to its further decline. The
failure of APEC to provide any meaningful response to the biggest economic crisis in the Asia-
Pacific region since 1945 has made the project less important, if not irrelevant, primarily for Asian
countries. As in the case of ASEAN, not even good advice was provided. The two APEC Summits
that could have proposed solutions to the crisis, the 1997 meeting in Vancouver and the 1998
meeting in Kuala Lumpur, were not able to provide the slightest hint on an alternative rescue
package for the countries affected by the crisis. In particular the Vancouver meeting could have
been important, but the leaders only endorsed the IMF’s policies.8 These, however, have driven the
region much deeper than necessary into crisis and did not contribute to its solution (cf. for example
Dieter 1998; Stiglitz 2000).
However, some observers have claimed that APEC has been blamed unfairly. Harris argues that
the Asian crisis has not resulted in a protectionist surge in the region:
„Given the limited role APEC could be expected to play directly, the hope was initially
that APEC could hold the line in the trade field in the face of the downturn; to resist the
pressure on countries to turn inward and protect individual domestic markets and
producers. Contrary to a wide expectation at the time, the line was held – and indeed in a
number of countries, further liberalisation has taken place” (Harris 1999, p. 13).
Harris’ argument raises two issues in particular. Firstly, it has to be asked why APEC is not able to
provide a response to an economic crisis. Instead not only the IMF, but also the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank were called to the rescue. Even though APEC does not have
financial resources for a bail-out, a meaningful project of regional co-operation and integration
should be able to at least provide some expertise in a crisis. The inability to provide an answer to
the problems of the countries affected by the crisis has downgraded the standing of the project in
the region. It could also be argued that the Asian crisis has underlined APEC’s status as a mere
dialogue scheme: APEC serves the purpose of creating a forum to talk to each other in a very
                                                          
7) Two reservations have to be made: Firstly, the creation of a free trade area of sufficient size may encourage
direct foreign investment. Secondly, the establishment of a free trade area with one of the poles of the global economy,
e.g. between South Africa and the European Union, can bring substantial benefit to the participating developing
economy.
8) The Leaders’ Declaration did mention the discussion of the financial crisis, but the suggested responses on
the regional level were limited to regional surveillance and improved regulatory capacities. With regard to crisis
prevention on the global level, the IMF’s importance was underlined: “We believe it is critically important that we
move quickly to enhance the capacity of the international system to prevent or, if necessary, to respond to financial
crises of this kind. On a global level, the role of the IMF remains central” (APEC Leaders’ Declaration, 25 November
1997, Vancouver).
6heterogeneous region, but it does not represent a case of genuine regional integration.9  Secondly,
it is not clear why a protectionist backlash should have been expected in the first place. The
countries in crisis were confronted with a sudden shortage of capital, not with an inflow of goods
from other countries. The only APEC countries that can claim to have eased the crisis by not
raising the barriers to imports are the USA and to a lesser degree Australia. It is hard to see a
positive influence of the APEC process on policy makers in Washington. The policy choice to
keep American markets open was made, but not because Congress or the Clinton administration
wanted to strengthen APEC.
Although the rivalry between an Asian integration project and APEC is not new, elites in Asia
seem to reconsider the benefits of regionalism without America, probably without Anglo-Saxons.
In particular the American opposition to an “Asian Monetary Fund” may have sown the seeds for a
further polarisation of the relationship between the Anglo-Saxon and the Asian APEC countries
(cf. Dieter/Higgott 1998, p. 51).10
While East Asia provides the strongest arguments in favor of monetary regionalism, the Brazilian
crisis underlines further the assessment that conventional regionalism has failed in the event of a
financial crisis. The existing trade regime, i.e. the Mercosur, did not reduce the consequences of
the crisis. Although the Mercosur is not even a complete customs union yet, it even contributed to
the spreading of the crisis. Brazilian companies were benefiting from the devaluation of the Real
and could increase their exports to neighboring Argentina, in particular in the automotive sector.
Argentina in turn could not do anything, for its currency has been tied to the US dollar at an
exchange rate of one to one since 1991.11
The existing regional integration projects in East Asia, but also in the Southern Cone, have not
fared well during the recent crises. They have neither contributed to the prevention of the crises
nor have they made the resolution any easier. The challenge is to develop new forms of
regionalism that address these deficiencies of conventional regionalism.
                                                          
9) For a discussion of the various types of regionalism that emerged during the 1990s see Dieter 2000.
10) With hindsight, the Japanese proposal of an Asian Monetary Fund would perhaps not have avoided the Asian
crisis entirely, but it would have made a very valuable contribution to limiting the downturn. In fact, the crisis in
Korea, which started after the AMF proposal was rejected by the Americans and which primarily has been a liquidity
crisis, not a solvency crisis, could probably have been avoided all together.
11) Argentina has a so-called currency board with the US-Dollar. Moreover, the fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the
US-dollar has been written into Argentina’s constitution, which will therefore have to be altered in the event of a new
currency regime. Although the currency board may have been necessary after the almost traumatic experiences of the
country with hyperinflation in the 1980s, today this inflexible regime represents a burden for the Argentinean
economy.
73. The theory of conventional, trade-based regionalism: Balassa in the 1960s and in the
21st century?
Since the early 1960s, our thinking about regionalism has been influenced by Bela Balassa’s
approach to regional integration. Balassa has suggested that regional integration shall take place in
five distinct steps: Free trade area, customs union, common market, economic and monetary union
and finally political union (cf. Balassa 1961, 1987).
Balassa’s theory has been developed 40 years ago. The historical context was a different one: In
the 1960s, trade barriers, namely tariffs, were much more important than they are today. Financial
flows across the boundaries of national economies were not important. Most countries, including
the United States, were using capital controls to ensure that the fix d exchange rates of the Bretton
Woods system were not undermined by high inflows or outflows of capital.12 Trade integration
offered an answer to the economic goals of many countries: They could prepare for the world
market or, in a more radical but popular version, could dissociate their economies from the global
economy, which was obviously easier for a group than for individual countries.
In principle, Balassa’s theory reflected the regulations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). Article 24, permitting the creation of free trade areas and customs unions, was the
only major exception from the famous article 1, the most favoured nation clause. Balassa’s  theory
reflected those given conditions, but the theoretical underpinnings remained somewhat vague.
Why a scheme that requires a lot of bureaucratic effort, the free trade area, is included in Balassa’s
theory is not clear. The administrative work to set rules of origin and use certificates of origin can
be an obstacle to trade rather than facilitate it. The lower the averag  tariff, the higher the relative
burden of certificates of origin.
                                                          
12) The USA had reintroduced capital controls in the early 1960s, when rising imports, the costs of the Vietnam
War and high capital inflows were threatening the regime of fixed exchange rates (cf. Scherrer 2000, p. 21).
8Table 1: Main components of regionalism based on trade integration
Level Main Component Main Disadvantage
Free Trade Area Free trade within, but different
external tariffs
Need for certificates of origin
Customs Union Common external tariff Need for the establishment of a
common external tariff, which
can be difficult between
heterogeneous economies
Common Market Free movement of capital,
goods and labour
Freedom of labour can cause
problems between
heterogeneous economies
Economic and Monetary Union Common currency Fixing of exchange rates limits
ability to react to changing
economic conditions in the
different parts of the monetary
union
Political Union Creation of common political
institutions
Loss of sovereignty to
supranational body may prove
difficult
Table 1 provides an overview of the main components of conventional regionalism. Today, the
most problematic aspect of Balassa’s theory is that it does not provide any link of the monetary
policies and the financial sectors of the participating economies on the first three levels of
integration. In an era of growing capital flows, this constitutes a major deficiency. Furthermore,
the introduction of an economic and monetary union is a complete change of tune from the
previous three steps, where the emphasis lay on trade.
One may argue that this theory was modified when implemented in Europe. The creation of the
European Monetary System in 1979 added a strong element of monetary co-operation. Although
Europe added this element to its own integration process, the need for intensive co-operation with
regard to monetary and financial stability in an integration project is not yet reflected neither in the
theory of regionalism nor in the projects currently implemented outside of Europe.
94. Theoretical aspects of monetary regionalism
In contrast to conventional regionalism, monetary regionalism aims directly at levels four and five
of Balassa’s integration concept. Monetary regionalism wants to contribute to the stability of
currencies and financial markets in a region without having to formalise trade links. Like
conventional regionalism, it requires the willingness of participating states to enter a proc s
which will, if successfully implemented, lead at least to the creation of a common currency, but
eventually to a political union. Therefore, the willingness to give up a part of what has been
understood as a central element of a nation’s sovereignty and independence, in particular the
ability to issue an own currency, is central to monetary regionalism.
 To prepare a group of economies for a monetary union, several steps need to be taken. These
measures fall in two broad categories: Measures that stabilise financial markets and measures that
contribute to the stabilisation of exchange rates. These steps could be taken either by policy field
or in steps. It is imaginable to try and stabilise financial markets first and attempt to reduce
exchange rate volatility later. However, it is more plausible to structure the process in steps.
Implemented in steps, there is a chance for immediate gains in all policy fields relevant to
monetary regionalism.
I am suggesting an Integration process organised in four steps. The first two levels could be
termed ‘Regional Liquidity Fund’ and ‘Regional Monetary System’. Level 3 and 4 are similar to
Balassa’s scheme. However, it is only in those steps that I suggest the implementation of
agreements on trade integration.
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Table 2: Key components of monetary regionalism
Level 1: Regional
Liquidity Fund
Level 2: Regional
Monetary System
Level 3: Economic
and Monetary
Union
Level 4: Political
Union
Main
Component
Creation of a public
regional liquidity fund
Introduction of a
regional monetary
system with exchange
rate bands
Permanent fixing of
exchange rates and
creation of a single
currency
Creation of a political
union, national political
systems continue to
exist and cover most
issues
Political
Measures
Creation of a forum for
the central banks of the
region, i.e. a regional
monetary committee
Regular meetings of the
regional monetary
committee
Creation of common
political institutions,
establishment of a
Regional Central Bank
Creation of
supranational
institutions in some,
defined areas
Additional
Compo-
nents (crisis
manage-
ment)
Creation of a private
liquidity fund
Expansion of coverage
of existing regional
liquidity funds
Additional
Compo-
nents (crisis
prevention)
Creation of a regional
banking supervision
system based on the
BIS’ 25 core principles
of effective banking
supervision, parallel
national systems
continue to exist
Phasing out of national
banking supervision
Implementation of
Universal Debt-
Rollover Options with a
Penalty (Udrop)
Compulsory hedging of
credit denominated in
foreign currency
Reduction of the
coverage of compulsory
hedging
Capital controls of the
individual countries, in
particular on inflows,
may continue to exist
Phasing out of capital
controls
Trade
Compo-
nents
Facilitation of regional
trade by harmonising
norms and standards
Customs Union Free movement of
labour
Macroeco-
nomic
Policy
Joint monitoring of
monetary and fiscal
policy
Co-ordination and
harmonisation of
monetary policy, in
particular interest rate
policy as well as fiscal
policy, in particular on
debt levels
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These proposals are not a complete list of measures that could be taken within a regional
integration project that intends to improve its immunity against financial crisis. However, they
represent a set of policies that both aim at profound regional integration and provide instant
benefits for the participating economies. The concept of monetary regionalism as well as the
advantages and disadvantages of the individual measures will be considered in the following
section.
4. 1. Level 1: Regional Liquidity Fund
The central measure to be taken on level 1 is the creation of a public regional liquidity fund. This
is an attempt to provide a regional safety net if a crisis hits. The countries participating will have to
earmark a part or all of their foreign reserves for a liquidity pool. A participating central bank will
in such a system not only be able to use their own reserves, but also those of the other central
banks.
Evidently, this is a measure that requires substantial political will of the participating countries. A
factor limiting the required confidence is a ceiling on the percentage of foreign reserves that
participating central banks are willing to earmark for regional use. For the first level of monetary
regionalism, it seems adequate to limit the funds to ten per cent of foreign reserves. Conditions for
the use of other countries’ reserves would have to be strict: To avoid the abuse of the regional
liquidity fund, interest would have to be paid and the interest rate would have to be set at a
relatively high level. Also, the regional credit line should only be available for a short period, e.g.
three months up to six months.
The advantages of a public regional liquidity fund are substantial:
- A central bank using the other central banks’ reserves has a much higher chance to act as a
lender of last resort for the domestic financial sector, thus developing the ability to limit the
consequences of a credit crisis. Using the regional reserves, a central bank gains leverage. This
aspect is particularly relevant for economies that have partly or completely abandoned capital
controls, because the use of international financial markets and of loans denominated in
foreign currency limit the ability of central banks to act as lender of last resort.
- A regional liquidity fund could be used to defend fixed exchange rates. This potential function,
however, is probably not required on the first level of monetary regionalism.
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- Being able to use the entire region’s foreign reserves reduces the need for the individual central
bank to maintain costly foreign reserves. However, the whole group will have to maintain
substantial reserves.
- The provision of liquidity in a region would allow to v id having to go to the IMF. This
might be the single biggest advantage of a regional fund.
- Although a regional liquidity fund would only be activated in the event of a crisis, it would
encourage participating central banks to engage in permanent monitoring of economic
developments in the region.
In order to be able to establish a purposeful regional liquidity fund the participating central banks
will have to possess significant foreign reserves. Taking into consideration that initially probably
not more than 10 or 20 per cent of the reserves will be available for the regional liquidity fund,
this constitutes a major obstacles for monetary regionalism in some parts of the world. In other
parts, namely in East Asia, this does not represent a problem.
Whereas the measures to prevent a crisis from developing, which I will discuss below, are no
radical departure from the current system, a public regional liquidity fund is. It is directly aimed at
challenging the IMF’s current monopoly on crisis management. In the event of a crisis, there
would not be a need to negotiate with Washington. Consequently, the IMF would suffer a
substantial reduction of its relevance for the world economy.
A public regional liquidity fund could be accompanied by private regional liquidity funds. The
idea is that private banks and other financial intermediaries create a system which provides
liquidity in the event of a banking crisis. In Germany, such a system has been in place since 1974.
The “Liquiditäts-Konsortialbank”, Liko-Bank in short, is currently available to 136 participating
banks. When a bank gets into trouble, the other banks have to supply fresh money up to the
initially agreed limit. In the case of the Liko-Bank, private funds are augmented by funds from the
Bundesbank.13 As a principle, the private regional liquidity fund should operate as a first line of
defence for banks.
The creation of this system of private and public liquidity funds would be a significant step
forward for a regional integration project. It would both provide powerful instruments to limit
                                                          
13) At the beginning of the year 2000, an expansion of the Liko-Bank to cover the Eurozone is discussed. The
Bundesbank has suggested an expansion of the maximum amount provided by the private banks of up to Euro 10
billion and an extended credit line of the Bundesbank, which would be raised to Euro 5 billion (Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 January 2000).
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financial crisis and generate the functional basis for further integration.14 This becomes
particularly evident when monitoring of financial markets and banking supervision are included in
the integration process.
The provision of a public regional liquidity fund ought to be accompanied by two monitoring
bodies, a regional monetary committee and a regional banking supervision system. Committing
foreign reserves of a country’s central bank, even if it is limited to a certain percentage, is not a
simple bookkeeper’s exercise, but a genuine expression of confidence. In order to further build this
mutual trust, the regional monetary committee is of vital importance. Central bankers could meet
frequently, e.g. monthly, to discuss developments in the financial sector and in foreign exchange
markets. Although in the proposed structure of level 1 the fixing of exchange rates is not
envisaged, the regional monetary committee could prepare this step.
The establishment of a regional monetary committee would also contribute to the creation of
“intra-regional policy networks”, which enable policy makers to deepen their knowledge of their
partners in the region (cf. Higgott 1997).
Similarly, banking supervision could be advanced to the regional level. Apart from the beneficial
effect this could have for the integration process, national banking supervision seems to have
become more obsolete in the age of banks operating in global, rather than national, financial
markets. The installation of a regional body for banking supervision may not end the need for
national banking supervision immediately. However, in both systems the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) 25 core principles for effective banking supervision should be adhered to.
In addition to the creation of a Regional Liquidity Fund, measures to reduce the likelihood of
financial crises are a vital element of monetary regionalism. The aim is to force the private sector
to consider the risks associated with lending and borrowing.
Universal Debt-Rollover Options with a Penalty (Udrop) are a concept that Anne Siebert and
William Buiter suggested in 1999. Udrop are an option which can be exercised upon maturity of a
loan. The use of the option results in an extension of the credit, e.g. an additional 3 or 6 months.
The option has a price, which will have to be set before the deal is done. The cost of the option in
effect works like a tax on borrowing abroad. Consequently, borrowing domestically becomes
cheaper compared to foreign loans. Both parties would have to agree on the price, consequently
they would have to consider the risk associated with the loan.
                                                          
14) See also the functional integration theories of Mitrany (1975)  d Keck (1991).
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The implementation of Udrop would provide a number of advantages:
- Financial crises tend to be characterised by panic and by a lack of sober evaluation. In this
situation debtors gain valuable time. Liquidity problems caused by panic will be less likely.
- The necessity to find a price for the option will increase the readiness to thoroughly evaluate
the credit risk.
- The pressure on the exchange rate of a country affected by a credit crisis can be reduced.
- The implementation of a regional liquidity fund may raise the risk of moral hazard. Although
Udrop cannot completely exclude moral hazard, creditors would not walk away from a
financial crisis totally unaffected either. Losing the ability to get their capital back immediately
should dampen the risk of moral hazard. A public regional liquidity fund and Udrop represent
the most important elements of the first level of monetary regionalism.
- Udrop may enhance the macroeconomic stability of an economy, which in turn improves the
prospects for investment and growth.
- The implementation of Udrop requires neither a global consensus nor the approval from the
IMF.
- Although Udrop can also be implemented by individual countries, they are particularly suitable
for monetary regionalism: The collective introduction of Udrop will strengthen the bargaining
position of the participating countries and will reduce the risk of being cut off from
international financial markets.
- Implementing Udrop as an element of monetary regionalism will increase the strength and
efficacy of the financial systems.
By contrast, the disadvantages of Udrop, in particular when implemented by a group of
economies, are quite limited:
- Udrop can only provide help in the event of a liquidity crisis, not in a solvency crisis. In other
words: A bank or company facing bankruptcy will not be saved.
- Udrop increase the cost of borrowing and consequently deteriorate the competitive position of
the debtor relative to companies borrowing without Udrop.
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- The ability of individual countries to introduce Udrop may be limited because lenders may
collectively refuse to accept theses rollover-options.
- The support by the IMF for the introduction of Udrop is unclear and depends on the outcome
of the current reform discussion.
Another element of level 1, the compulsory hedging of credit denominated in foreign currency,
serves a similar purpose. Banks and companies that have to hedge their borrowings cannot be
affected by a deterioration of the exchange rate. Also, the compulsory hedging would also
contribute to exchange rate stability, because a shortage of foreign exchange, caused by debtors
trying to meet their payment deadlines, is less likely. Similar to Udrop, hedging increases the cost
of borrowing abroad. This may be a welcome prospect, since it raises the attractiveness of
borrowing domestically. But for the companies that prefer foreign loans compulsory hedging, just
as Udrop, represents additional cost. However, the stabilising effects seem to be more important: If
hedging of loans in foreign currency would have been the norm in East Asia, the Asian crisis
would have been much less severe, if it would have taken place at all.
On the first level of monetary regionalism, just like in conventional forms of regionalism, the
economies of the participating countries are quite likely to be heterogeneous. Taking the
experiences of the first wave of regional integration in the 1960s into consideration, it seems
necessary to provide measures for the weaker countries for self-protection. A main element would
be the permission to continue the use of capital controls. In particular, countries should be allowed
to limit the inflow of capital and to tie the inflow to certain conditions, e.g. favouring long-term
loans over short-term loans. Also, taxes on short-term inflows, a policy successfully implemented
by Chile in the 1990s, ought to be possible on the first level.
The establishment of formal schemes to facilitate trade is not necessarily part of the level 1. The
reason for excluding trade is mainly political: The creation of a free trade area or customs union
can be misinterpreted as the formation of a trade bloc and consequently can be used by policy
makers in other countries to justify import restrictions. These notions are particularly relevant for
economies producing high surpluses in their trade accounts over longer periods of time, i.e. East
Asian countries. Consequently, in other parts of the world, in particular in the Mercosur, the
exclusion of a formal regional trade regime is not important.
Macroeconomic policy does not have to be co-ordinated and harmonised on level 1, but
institutions should be created that permit the joint monitoring of macroeconomic developments.
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Such a step not only is an important precondition for the introduction of a monetary union, but also
contributes to the creation of intraregional policy networks.
4.2. Level 2: Regional Monetary System
The second step should be characterised by further preparation for monetary union. The
introduction of a regional monetary system with exchange rate bands between the participating
economies enables the participating economies to gain macroeconomic stability. The advantage of
this system over a system with permanently fixed rates is obvious: It permits adjustments of
exchange rates.
Finding the appropriate exchange rates and useful exchange rate bands obviously is not an easy
task. If the bands are too broad, the benefits from such a scheme are limited. Exporters and
importers in such an arrangement with wide bands would still have to hedge their receipts from
transactions in foreign currency. Therefore, exchange rate bands which are wider than, say, 10 per
cent might be more symbolic than functional. On the other hand, if a very narrow exchange rate
band is chosen, i.e. + two per cent, the risk of markets testing those bands quickly and successfully
seems to be quite high.
After the experience with the European Monetary System, which operated successfully for more
than a decade but partly collapsed in 1992, a regional monetary system may have lost some of its
appeal. However, this system has to be evaluated in comparison with the other plausible
alternatives: Countries may either opt for completely flexible exchange rates or currency boards.
Neither of these two alternatives is without substantial disadvantages either.
Flexible rates seem to be the easiest system: Central banks just watch the fluctuations of exchange
rates and do not try to stabilise them. But flexible rates are a major obstacle for an expansion of
international or regional trade. Importers and exporters do not have a solid basis to calculate future
receipts. This can partly be overcome by hedging, but hedging is a costly insurance. Needless to
say that the providers of this type of insurance, i.e. big banks, regard flexible rates as the best
exchange rate system.
A currency board on the other hand leaves the central bank with very little room for manoeuvre.
The exchange rate is fixed vis-à-vis an anchor currency, and domestic money supply is determined
by the amount of foreign reserves a central bank holds. Although this system offers an alternative
for economies previously plagued by very high inflation and very volatile exchange rates, it is no
cure for the majority of developing countries and emerging economies. The reason for this is that
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finding a suitable anchor currency is much more difficult than it appears at first. Due to the
volatility of exchange rates between Dollar, Euro and Yen a currency board only transmits those
fluctuations. A currency tied to the US-Dollar, for instance, would currently be a problem for an
economy which exports substantially to the Eurozone.
Therefore, rather than trying to stabilise exchange rates at the periphery, more stable exchange
rates in the core of the world economy would be helpful. The desirability of a system of exchange
rate bands between the poles of the world economy was underlined in a report of the Council on
Foreign Relations published in 1999. In a minority vote US economist Fred Bergsten, hedge fund
celebrity George Soros and Paul Volcker, from 1979 to 1987 head of the US Federal Reserve
Bank, have called for the implementation of flexible bands between the main currencies. They
vividly pledged for a new currency regime, without which they cannot envisage a successful
reform of the international financial system:
“Our point is that ‘reforming the international financial architecture’ without reforming
the currency regime is like watching Hamlet without the Prince. The international
monetary system will continue to be ineffective and crisis prone until that crucial
centrepiece of its operation is thoroughly revamped. We urge the G-3 countries to adopt
some variant of target zones in the near future” (Co ncil on Foreign Relations 1999, p.
129).
The problem is that such a regime seems increasingly less likely. Although from a pure technical
point it is feasible,  the political will for such a project is hard to spot, in particular in the USA.
Policy makers in the US currently seem to suffer from  “hegemonic illusion”: There willingness to
encourage in co-operative multilateral regimes appears to be very limited. Although this unipolar
moment will not last, for the time being other countries and regions cannot expect the US to play a
constructive role in the shaping of a more stable global financial system.15 Consequently, a
regional system of exchange rate bands appears to be a plausible alternative.
The establishment of a regional monetary system will have to be accompanied by an
intensification of the co-operation by monetary authorities. Although separate currencies continue
to exist, the intensity of communication between central bankers would have to be improved and
regular meetings of the regional monetary committee appear to be useful. The press coverage of
these meetings could be used to raise the awareness of citizens in the region with regard to the
implementation of the integration process.
                                                          
15) For a discussion of the current American unilateralism and its consequences for world politics and the world
economy see, for example, Bergsten 1999, Huntington 1999,  Pfaff 8.
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When monetary co-operation is intensified and the coverage of the existing regional liquidity fund
has been expanded, the additional measures taken for crisis prevention can gradually be phased
out. If the regional monetary system operates sufficiently well, in particular the compulsory
hedging of credit denominated in foreign currency may be phased out.
Trade facilitation could start to play a greater role on level 2. However, the establishment of a free
trade area is not suggested: Firstly, because of the undesired administrative costs, secondly,
because of the potential political vulnerability caused by formal trade regimes. Nevertheless, trade
facilitation may be implemented. Especially the harmonisation of norms and standards could make
a valuable contribution to the integration process.
In preparation for level 3, the economic and monetary union, monetary and fiscal policy will have
to be harmonised. Although the experience of the Eurozone offers no blueprint that can directly be
applied elsewhere, the five criteria used in the process leading to the creation of the Eurozone have
a certain plausibility. These have been:
- the level of existing public debt shall not exceed 60 per cent of GDP,
- new public debt has to be less than 3 per cent of GDP,
- the inflation rate should not be more than 1.5 per cent above the inflation rate in the three
countries with the lowest inflation,
- the economies must have participated successfully, i.e. without adjustments, in the European
Monetary System for at least two years,
- long-term interest rates should not be more than 2.0 per cent above the respective rates for the
three best economies.16
The plausibility of those criteria is sufficient. The combination of measures to evaluate public debt
and inflation is simple enough to be workable. It includes two criteria which are primarily
determined by markets (exchange rate, long-term interest rate), not by official declaration. At the
same time, the treaty provides some flexibility regarding these five criteria, in particular
concerning the level of public debt, which may be above 60 per cent provided it is sufficiently fast
approaching the 60 per cent criterion. On the other hand, the levels set have no specific
explanation. For instance, why a level of 60 per cent was chosen is unclear. Nevertheless, the
combination of factors considered assures a certain level of macroeconomic stability.
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4.3. Level 3: Economic and Monetary Union
The creation of an economic and monetary union is more than a simple step for an integration
project. Clearly, quite a few conditions have to be met before such a far-reaching measure can be
implemented. At the same time, an economic and monetary union has disadvantages that
participating countries may not want. In particular the inability to react to differing economic
developments within the union with exchange rate adjustments can be seen as a major
disadvantage of this level of regional integration.
However, an economic and monetary union clearly has major advantages over a regional monetary
system. Transaction costs are permanently reduced and competition within the union is
strengthened. Above all, xchange rate adjustments within the union are no longer a threat.
Companies do no longer have to pay for hedging against exchange rate volatility.
It seems hard to envisage the establishment of an economic and monetary union as the final stage
of regional integration. Once a common currency has been created, an integration project that
would limit itself to economic policy would quickly face, rightly so, criticism regarding the lack of
democratic control over economic policy. Therefore, beyond the creation of a regional central
bank other common political institutions will have to be created, at least in an integration project
of democratic societies.
As integration proceeds, it is plausible to see the phasing out of national banking supervision. The
regional banking supervision should in the process have been strengthened sufficiently to warrant
the abolishment of national banking supervision. Also, the creation of a single currency could be
accompanied by the phasing out of capital controls: The risk of a speculative attack on the
currency of an economy is done away with. The entire integration project may decide to maintain
or even introduce capital controls vis-à-vis the rest of the world, but internal flows should no
longer be restricted.
With regard to trade, once the third level of integration is reached at least a customs union  is
required. Although theoretically trade within a project of monetary regionalism could still be
subject to tariffs and other forms of trade restrictions, one of the aims of a common currency, i.e.
the strengthening of competition, could not be achieved. A free trade area, however, should not be
implemented, because of the need to administer certificates of origin: Trade would not be
facilitated. At the same time, restrictions on migration could remain in place. In particular in areas
                                                                                                                                                                                             
16) Cf. the homepage of the Bundesbank (www.bundesbank.de). 
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with greatly differing levels of development, the introduction of the freedom of employees to
move within the union might be limited to the last and final level of integration.
4.4. Level 4: Political Union
The completion of the integration process, the creation of a political union, will not require many
additional measures with regard to economic policy, but rather demand political integration. In
particular, supranational political decision making bodies have to be founded.
In most areas, economic policy integration will have been implemented on lower levels of
integration. A deepening of the integration process could be the reduction of national tax systems
in favour of a uniform union-wide tax system. But measures of that nature do not seem to be vital
for the success of the political. A certain variation of tax rates would not undermine the integration
project.
The main benefit of the integration project continues to exist during the entire implementation
phase: The region would gain independence and would be quite immune against financial crises.
The preconditions for such a scheme are high, and probably only in East Asia monetary
regionalism could be implemented.
5. Prospects for Monetary Regionalism in East Asia and Consequences for the IMF
The first evidence of an emergence of monetary regionalism and a turning away from the IMF is to
be found in East Asia. Rightly so, the region perceives the IMF's policy as humiliating and wrong.
In addition, in the summer of 1997 the IMF together with the US government impeded the
Japanese initiative to create an Asian liquidity fund. The Asian Monetary Fund was explicitly to
apply softer conditions than those of the IMF. The AMF's concept corresponded to being more of
a 'lender of last resort' than the IMF. Essentially, the AMF idea was about providing unconditional
loans to overcome liquidity crises (cf. Dieter/Higgott 1998).
At the end of 1999, after the worst impacts of the Asian crisis had been overcome, East Asian
circles once again addressed the topic of more intensive regional cooperation. The regular ASEAN
summits were expanded by the participation of Japan, China and South Korea, and the meeting
held in Manila at the end of November last year adopted an ambitious plan. The summit chair,
Philippines President Joseph Estrada, told the news media the goals were a common market,
monetary union and an East Asian Community (Financial Times, 29 November 1999, p. 4).
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The significance of the fact that Japanese observers also now advocate monetary cooperation in
East Asia should not be underestimated. In an interview with the New Straits Times in mid-
January this year, Eisuke Sakakibara, former state secretary of the Japanese finance ministry,
spoke out for a cooperative monetary regime in East Asia (World Bank, Development News, 12
January 2000).
To be sure, the outlines of this East Asian integration project are still very unclear. But it appears
that cooperation in the sectors of monetary policy and finance markets will have more importance
than trade policy agreements. At present, it does not appear to be unrealistic to expect the
development of an 'East Asian Financial Caucus' in the medium term. The project will focus less
on trade issues than on cooperation in the monetary and finance policy sector.
The first details of the new project were given during the fourth ASEAN finance ministers'
conference at the end of March this year. True, there is no longer talk of an East Asian monetary
fund, but there are plans for setting up a regional liquidity aid system. In a crisis, the central banks
of the participating countries are to have speedy access to the currency reserves of the other states
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 March 2000; f. the declaration of the ASEAN Finance
Ministers www.asean.or.id). In other words: The region has started to create a regional liquidity
fund. Implemented successfully, it would give the region greater autonomy: in a crisis the
neighbours help out, not the IMF.
At the beginning of May 2000, Japan has suggested a plan of a network of currency swaps, in
effect a regional liquidity fund, to Asian finance ministers attending the annual meeting of the
Asian Development Bank in Thailand. The idea is that Asian countries should be able to borrow
from each other through short-term swaps of currency reserves (cf. Financial Times, 6/7 May
2000, p. 9). The fact that Japan is trying to take the lead in this initiative invites two conclusions.
Firstly, Japanese policy makers have learnt from the missed ‘golden opportunity’ (Walden Bello)
to create an Asian Monetary Fund in 1997 and do not want to be passive bystanders this time.
Secondly, the matter seems to be taken care of with urgency, considering the short time span
between the first suggestion for such arrangements were made: Barely six weeks passed between
the Manila meeting of ASEAN finance ministers and the tabling of the Japanese proposal.17
                                                          
17) However, the Japanese government is still unwilling to confront the US and the IMF with such a proposal.
Rather than calling it what it is, i.e. an alternative to the IMF, Japanese delegates stressed that bypassing the IMF was
not an aim of their proposal (cf. Financial Times, 6/7 May 2000, p. 9). But why suggest that plan if there is no need to
bypass the IMF?
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Il Sakong, chairman of the Korean Institute for Global Economics, during the meeting in Chiang
Mai underlined the need for a regional response:
“We need to have some kind of defense mechanism. Since not much is expected to be done
at the global level, something should be done at the regional level” (F nancial Times,
6/7 May 2000, p. 9)
The finance ministers of the ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan and South Korea reached an
agreement in Chiang Mai, although major elements of the proposal still have to be finalised.
However, the very fact that these countries are focussing on the generation of greater financial
stability marks a new era of regionalism in East Asia.
The forward looking and inclusive character of the project is underlined by China’s participation.
Today, China has no need for additional liquidity from the region. Together with Hong Kong’s
monetary authority, China’s central bank has reserves of US-Dollar 250 billion, much than enough
for an economy that enjoys the additional safety net of comprehensive capital controls. Xiang
Huajcheng, China’s finance minister, therefore emphasised in his statement not the relevance of
the project for China, but rather for the region.18
The currently existing level of reserves in East Asia makes the creation of a regional liquidity fund
a plausible exercise. The region has more foreign reserves than any other. Even without Taiwan,
which alone enjoys reserves of more than US-Dollar 100 billion, the central banks of East Asia
together have more than US-Dollar 800 billion at their disposal. The European Central Bank, by
comparison, even after the recent doubling of reserves only has foreign reserves of about $ 90
billion.19  Even if only 20 per cent of this amount would be used in a financial crisis, the amount of
money available would appear to be sufficient to act as lender of last resort. If, say, Thailand
would be faced with a new financial crisis, it could draw upon almost US-Dollar 190 billion: it
own reserves of US-Dollar 34.1 billion plus additional US-Dollar 155.4 billion from the regional
liquidity fund. The amount of money available to the Thai central bank would exceed the IMF-led
lending to Thailand, Korea and Indonesia by about US-Dollar 50 billion.20
                                                          
18) Xiang said that China supported the project because it would contribute to the economic and financial
stability of the region (cf. Financial Times, 8 May 2000, p. 10).
19) The entire reserves of the Eurozone, including the reserves of the national central banks, stood at about $ 345
billion in February 2000 (cf. Der Tagesspiegel, 9 May 2000).
20) In the Chiang Mai meeting, the envisaged volume of the swap agreements was very limi ed. Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines discussed an expansion of their existing swap arrangements from $
200 million to $ 2 billion (cf. Financial Times, 8 May 2000, p. 10). Although such a step would not do harm, it clearly
is too limited for an effective regional liquidity fund, which needs both Japan and China as contributing partners.
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The Financial Times has immediately criticised the agreement of Chiang Mai. Asian policy
makers would be tempted to delay reform, thereby missing the opportunity to provide real safety
against speculative attacks on their currencies:
“Asian governments must not forget that sound policies, strong banks and well-run
corporations are better than any currency arrangements for warding off speculative
attacks” (Financial Times, 10 May 2000, p. 22).
Although the Financial T mes acknowledges that the creation of a regional network system is a
major step forward for East Asia, in its critique, essential points are missed. The creation of the
regional liquidity fund does not necessarily imply that Asian governments must use the additional
financial means to return to fixed exchange rates; at least not immediately. The initial purpose of
the regional liquidity fund may well be limited to providing sufficient liquidity for banks and
corporation that, due to a sudden swing in market sentimen , may be confronted with an inability
to rollover existing debt denominated in foreign currency. The absence of comprehensive capital
controls in most economies of East Asia has made the task of central banks much more
complicated. Due to the fact that banks and corporations are able to borrow abroad in foreign
currency a central bank with limited reserves has limited power to provide liquidity in the event of
a crisis. For this reason without strong central banks it is difficult to build a solid, strong financial
sector. It might be helpful to remember the influential roles that central banks had in western
economies when financial crises hit. Just consider the role of the Bundesbank played in solving the
bankruptcy of the Herstatt Bank in 1974 or the Federal Reserve’s role in solving the Savings &
Loans debacle of the 1980s. Therefore, the creation of a network of strong central banks is a
precondition for stability in the financial sectors of East Asia. Thus, the FT’s comment
underestimates how much markets can overshoot. A primary concern of Asian finance ministers is
therefore to avoid the negative consequences of this dark side of market processes, as the Bank for
International Settlement has called it. This is a legitimate and significant function of governments.
The high level of foreign reserves is making East Asia not only the most likely region for
monetary regionalism, but it might be the only region where such a concept can be implemented.
Reserves are not only high, they are also quite well distributed in the region. The tw  largest
economies, Japan and China, also have the largest reserves. In the event of a crisis, those two
economies would make the highest contribution. Also, considering the high level of reserves, a
regional liquidity fund is plausible even without using too high a percentage of the reserves of the
participating central banks.
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In other parts of the world the picture might be a different one. The Mercosur, for instance, would
have too limited foreign reserves to start a project of monetary regionalism based on the creation
of a regional liquidity pool. Even if Chile would participate, the foreign reserves of Argentina,
Brazil and Chile currently only total US-Dollar 74.9 billion, an amount insufficient for the creation
of a regional liquidity fund that only uses ten or twenty per cent of all reserves.21 However, those
economies with more limited reserves could still implement other elements of monetary
regionalism, e.g. Udrop, regional banking supervision or the creation of a private regional liquidity
fund. Also, macroeconomic co-ordination and joint monitoring would be possible.22
                                                          
21) In March 2000, Argentina had reserves of $ 24,7 billion, Brazil $ 36.2 billion and Chile $ 14.0 billion (cf. the
Economist, 22 April 2000, p. 122).
22) Brazil’s president Fernando Enrique Cardoso has called for an augmented Mercosur. He suggested the
inclusion of macroeconomic issues and suggested a stability pact à la Maastricht for the Southern Cone (Financial
Times, 10 November 1999, p. 5).
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Table 3: Foreign reserves of East Asian economies
Country Reserves in March 2000 in
billions of US-Dollar
20 % available for a regional
liquidity fund
Brunei (1999) 0.5 0.1
China 156.8 31.36
Hong Kong 96.3 19.26
Indonesia 26.3 5.26
Malaysia 30.6 6.12
Philippines 12.9 2.58
Singapore 74.3 14.86
South Korea 74.0 14.8
Thailand 34.1 6.82
Japan 305,5 61.1
Total 811.3 162.26
Taiwan 103.5 20.7
Total inc. Taiwan 914.8 182.96
Source: The Economist, March 4th 2000, p. 122; Brunei Currency Board, Japanese Ministry of
Finance.
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6. Conclusions
The concept of monetary regionalism potentially offers a new avenue of regional integration in
particular to the economies of East Asia. Elsewhere, the level of foreign reserves that is necessary
to implement the first level of integration seems to be too limited. In East Asia, the conditions for
monetary regionalism are good. Economically, the level of reserves is high enough to provide
sufficient liquidity. Politically, the Asian crisis has substantially increased the willingness of
policy makers to try a new international regime that promises to avoid a repetition of the traumatic
events of 1997 and 1998. Although the Asian crisis did not result in war or civil war, the hardship
suffered by millions of people in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea, but also the Philippines
and Malaysia has raised policy makers’ willingness to explore new avenues of regional co-
operation.
Although a successful implementation of monetary regionalism in East Asia would be good news
for the region, it might be bad news for the IMF. If East Asia opts for an alternative safety system,
the Fund will loose importance and consequently will be less able to shape the global economy. In
contrast to the situation at the beginning of the 21st century, the IMF would be unable to provide a
blueprint for the road of development developing countries in East Asia ought to be taking. At the
same time, one of the few important institutions of multilateral institutions would be driven out of
business. That might not be a bad thing, but on the other hand the prospect of a world that is once
again characterised by bloc confrontation is not very promising.
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